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1. Introduction 1
 
The legal rules and policies underlying the definition, granting, and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) are among the most important of Europe's interests in the 
development of a European Information Society. This paper examines many of the 
technical, economic, and social issues that need to be considered in the area of intellectual 
property rights. It begins with a brief introduction to the copyright and patent IPR systems 
and the European Union, national, and international systems governing the definition and 
enforcement of these rights. The introduction highlights inconsistent treatments of 
copyright and patent rights under existing law which are particularly important for the 
future of the European Information Society.  
 
The remainder of this paper analyses the level and nature of copyright protection of authors 
and publishers in distributing information over communication networks that use the 
emerging global information infrastructure. We outline the characteristics of the social 
constituencies who are benefiting from development of the information infrastructure and 
identify their expectations. We consider the security issues involved in providing IPR 
protection to authors and publishers and some of the opportunities and constraints for 
improving protection. These security issues are then considered in the light of 
developments in the way revenues are generated through the provision of information 
services on telecommunication networks. The final section argues that the costs and 
benefits must be weighed in any further extensions of copyright protection and offers some 
suggestions for weighing policy alternatives.  
 
 
2.0 The Costs and Benefits of IPR Protection 
 
Technological, social, and economic innovations in the generation and distribution of 
information are occurring at a rapid pace as well as supporting ‘convergence’, the 
bringing together of voice, text, audio, and visual materials together in a common 
digital format. The ideal of convergence is a bit stream encompassing all forms of 
electronic communication in which information can be stored, manipulated, and 
exchanged over telecommunication networks and delivered on demand to individual 
users’ computers or ‘multimedia’ equipment. Accompanying these technological 
innovations are shifts in the meaning of time, place, and distance due to the growing use 
of information and communication technologies. These shifts open opportunities and 
are providing impetus to the restructuring of people’s work, recreation, and learning 
activities as well as how they interact with one another in pursuing these activities. 
They are creating new preferences and new markets which alter how people earn their 
living and spend their money and time. A defining characteristic of the information 
society is that the activities of creating, distributing, and consuming information are of 
growing importance in the lives of citizens. 
 
At the centre of these developments is the potential for dramatic improvement in the 
capacity of telecommunication networks to distribute information in digital format. As 
this potential is gradually realised, it is providing a system for interconnecting 
information production and consumption activities on a global basis. Such a system 
could provide support for an enormous range of production and consumption activities 
throughout the world and it is referred to as the ‘global information infrastructure’ or 
3 
GII. In practice, however, the GII exists only as an abstract idea, a potential that may or 
may not be realised depending upon future developments.2
 
What is happening now is growing attention to the improvement of national information 
infrastructures and to a European-wide information infrastructure. Within Europe, there 
is a determination to make innovative contributions to the construction of information 
infrastructures. The legal rules and policies underlying the definition, granting, and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) are among the most important of 
Europe's interests in the construction of these information infrastructures.  
 
Intellectual property laws extend the right of property protection under law to creations 
such as inventions, literary or artistic works, or trade marks. After a particular creation 
is granted protection under one of the several systems of IPR law, it may be sold or 
licensed. The goals that may be served by extending property right protection to 
creations include: 1) promoting invention and the authorship of new work by 
safeguarding the right of creators from others who may simply copy their ideas or 
works, 2) encouraging the dissemination of ideas and the disclosure of inventions to 
foster the creative activities of others, and 3) protecting the rights of authors to be 
recognised and to receive income from their work. IPR protection attempts to balance 
society's interest in the disclosure and dissemination of ideas by creating an exclusive 
right to control and profit from invention and authorship. It is possible to have too little 
protection, thereby reducing the incentives for invention and authorship. It is also 
possible to have too much protection, which will discourage the adaptation and 
improvement of ideas.  
 
IPR protection interacts, and sometimes conflicts, with competition, trade, and social 
policy.3 The exclusivity of IPRs may create market power. This may be a concern if it is 
achieved through the exclusive control of some other asset such as the only site for a 
shipping dock. In trade policies, the search for reciprocity and competitive markets may 
conflict with international differences in intellectual property protection. Social policies 
seek to promote education, health, environment protection, and a host of other 
objectives. In many cases it is necessary to use intellectual property to achieve these 
objectives.  
 
With some exceptions, the right of the creator to legal protection is absolute, without 
regard to who violates IPRs or for what purposes. The cost of creating the incentives for 
invention or authorship through IPR protection is born by social actors as well as 
private commerce. Although, none of these conflicts provides a compelling reason to 
alter existing systems of IPR protection, it must be recognised that this system has costs 
as well as benefits. The following section sketches the copyright and patent system by 
focusing on principles and institutions that are particularly relevant to the development 
of advanced telecommunication services and the information infrastructure.  
 
 
3.0 Intellectual Property Right Systems 
 
Systems for granting rights in intellectual property embody and reflect legal doctrines 
and principles that are particular to the development of legal systems. For example, 
France developed a particular interest in the idea of protecting the author’s right to 
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control the copying and potential modification of their work. By contrast, copyright law 
in England emerged from a desire to regulate competition and was endorsed in the 
United States constitution as a means to ‘promote the Progress of Science and the 
Useful Arts.’4 The British and United States’ motivations for protecting the commercial 
interests of publishers have been emphasised in economic analyses of copyright law 
although elements of the French tradition of droit d’auteur such as droit moral (the 
moral rights of authors to be identified and to avoid alteration of their work without 
permission) and droit de suite (the right of authors to benefit from the subsequent sales 
of their work) are a continuing influence in efforts to bring together varying national 
systems of copyright protection.
 
Copyright law grants the owner of a copyright on particular types of works an exclusive 
right to control the making of copies, broadcasting, or other forms of distribution of that 
work to the public.5 A broadly accepted definition of what constitutes a work is that it 
includes ‘every production in the literary, artistic and scientific domain, whatever may 
be the mode or form of its expression.’6 This definition encompasses much of the 
information that might be created for distribution in a GII. Its coverage, however, is not 
quite as universal as the definition suggests and substantial national differences 
continue to exist.7 This has led to efforts to clarify existing law in several areas 
including: a) the protection of databases which may consist of compilations of 
individual pieces of information that may not be granted copyright individually,8 b) 
multimedia works whose components may be individually copyrighted but can be more 
efficiently protected if the work as a whole is protected, and c) works that may be 
‘transmitted’ over a network..9
 
Works must also meet certain standards of originality to qualify for this right. Copyright 
protects how ideas are ‘expressed’ rather than the ideas themselves, but the line between 
expression and ideas is often unclear. For example, no-one owns the copyright to the 
idea of a detective novel but a work that closely copies the plot ideas of a detective 
novel may be in violation of copyright even if no sentence is exactly the same. The line 
between idea and expression is particularly important for software and multimedia 
because the innovative character of these works may reside in their ‘look and feel’ to 
users and because of the relative ease by which a particular ‘expression’ may be 
modified by the use of software authoring techniques. These problems are active areas 
of litigation within national copyright systems. 
 
National standards for the protection of IPRs were among the first efforts by European 
countries to harmonise their legal systems through international agreement. Signatories 
of the Berne Copyright Convention of 1886 agreed to enforce the copyright of foreign 
authors according to their own copyright laws and to enact national laws addressing 
copyright coverage and other issues. The Berne Copyright Convention is monitored by 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The Berne Convention was a 
major step toward harmonisation of European copyright enforcement since it allowed 
legal action in the country in which a violation occurred regardless of the nationality of 
the author. Successive agreements during this century have extended the minimum 
rights granted by The Berne Convention, e.g. for public performances, and the cinema. 
Its international significance has been enhanced by the addition of the United States in 
1989 and many developing countries as signatories. The Berne Convention provides an 
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international framework for copyright enforcement for the protection of many of the 
forms of information that can be made available using information infrastructures. 
 
The Berne Convention does not, however, determine what the level of protection is to 
be in any particular signatory country. The existence of relatively weak protection in 
some non-OECD countries was influential in the establishment of the Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, part of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round agreements. The TRIPS agreement 
articulates the norms for national law suggested in the Berne Convention and allows for 
trade sanctions against non-complying nations. For such sanctions to occur, a national 
complaint must be lodged by a signatory with the World Trade Organisation (WTO).10 
From a developing country viewpoint, TRIPS may create exposure to trade sanctions in 
actions stemming from GII development that are difficult to detect or enforce. This may 
create an impediment to the diffusion of information and communication technologies 
in these countries. 
 
In addition to IPRs in the exchange of information, the development of the information 
infrastructure requires substantial investment in inventions, the subject of patent law. 
The grant of a patent gives the applicant the exclusive right to the use of the invention 
in exchange for disclosing how a person skilled in the art of the patent’s subject could 
understand and work the invention. Patent systems, like copyright systems, originate in 
national legislation and are increasingly governed by international agreements such as 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883).11 Unlike the 
Berne Convention which dispenses with the formality of copyright application among 
signatories, the Paris Convention applies only to the rights of foreign nationals to apply 
for, and be granted, patents on the same terms as residents of the signatory countries. 
Although the criterion for granting patents varies between countries, it generally 
includes an element of novelty, some practical use, and an inventive step (i.e. a step that 
will not be obvious to a person skilled in the subject matter of the patent). 
 
In the effort to build a European information infrastructure, patents raise two main 
issues. The first is the use of patents to develop control over an area of technology for 
reaching customers such as the development of ‘set-top boxes’ or other equipment for 
the receipt of audio-visual and data transmissions.12 The second is the possibility that 
equipment developed to upgrade and extend business use of the European information 
infrastructure may be based on patented technologies that raise entry barriers and reduce 
competition, reducing the extent of interconnectability and interoperability of the 
network and thereby defeating the aim of creating a seamless European information 
infrastructure. 
 
There are two basic issues that need to be considered in establishing policy in the area 
of IPR to serve the goal of building information infrastructures for the information 
society. The first is the level and nature of copyright protection to be afforded to authors 
and publishers in distributing information over information infrastructures. The second 
is how to weigh the balance between encouraging innovation in advanced information 
and communication technologies and the possibility that control and effective 
ownership of such innovations might be concentrated and lead to undesirable outcomes. 
The second of these issues is dealt with here. 
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Issues of control and effective ownership of the European information infrastructure 
are, in the first instance, matters of regulatory policy.13 IPRs may support the extension 
of this control through the software or hardware interfaces that govern interconnection 
within the information infrastructure. With regard to software interfaces, the European 
Union software directive provides that an authorised user of a computer program may 
obtain the necessary information to achieve interoperability of that program with other 
software. It prohibits the conduct of this activity for developing, producing or marketing 
a computer program that is substantially similar in expression. This is a significant 
limitation of copyright protection to achieve the goals of interconnectivity and 
interoperability of information infrastructures. With regard to hardware interfaces, no 
similar protection for interoperability exists.  
 
In advanced information and communication technologies, what is accomplished by 
embedding a technical system in hardware and what is accomplished through the use of 
software is a matter of design choice. The European Commission directive on software 
creates an incentive for producers of advanced information and communication 
networks to embed interfaces in hardware in order to achieve the higher level of IPR 
protection afforded by the patent system. This is because patent law allows interfaces to 
be patented. Patent protection includes the use of the patented idea in the design of 
interconnectable or interoperable interfaces.14 The use of hardware patents to control 
interfaces in the information infrastructure can create ‘gatekeepers’ that fragment or 
delay the progress toward network interconnectivity and interoperability. If patent law 
was to be modified to support this goal, this would be a major change with far reaching 
consequences in terms of the impact it would be likely to have on the construction of a 
‘seamless’ interconnected and interoperable European information infrastructure.  
 
The same effect could be achieved through regulation if regulatory policy is used to 
prohibit the use of patent protection to control portions of the European information 
infrastructure. Such directives might be similar to those supporting implementation of 
Open Network Provision (ONP).15 This case, however, is more complex because it 
would involve regulating technology designs whose interfaces are not yet part of the 
network information infrastructure and which are supplied by players that are non-
European. It would be possible, nevertheless, to devise a threshold test that would 
engage regulatory action when a patented interface technology seems likely to play a 
significant role in construction of the information infrastructure. Practical solutions to 
this problem are necessary because interconnection and interoperability are vital in 
developing the information infrastructure for the European information society. IPR 
protection should not provide for higher levels of protection to interfaces implemented 
in hardware than those for software interfaces.  
 
The next sections are devoted to the analysis of the level and implications of copyright 
protection that may be afforded authors and publishers in distributing information using 
information infrastructures.  
 
 
4.0 Social Constituencies in the Information Society 
 
The motivations for the supply of information and the interests in accessing this 
information can be discerned by examining publicly accessible information services. 
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These services include Minitel, the Internet, other research or university oriented 
computer networks, information service providers such as CompuServe, and services 
provided by hardware or software companies such as Apple Computer's eWorld or The 
Microsoft Network. The reasons for developing these networks and for supplying 
information to them include, for example, the aims of contributing to publicly available 
information, of promoting activities such as research and education, and generating 
commercial revenues. Users or subscribers to these networks have a diverse collection 
of reasons for accessing this information. They are often suppliers of information 
themselves such as when they communicate political, cultural, and social views or share 
practical information, ‘post’ research results, and offer goods and services for sale.  
 
Two striking features shared by almost all of these systems is the large amount of 
material that is contributed without charge and the use of networks to communicate 
information that is not subject to copyright. At the same time, however, commercial 
networks provide and promote access to information that is subject to copyright. A 
rapidly growing stock of such information is also found on non-commercial networks. 
These observations suggest the need for a closer examination of producer and user 
motivations in using these networks and the definition of the constituencies associated 
with different uses. 
 
4.1 Three Constituencies 
 
Broadly, copyright protection plays a different role for three different constituencies of 
individuals and organisations. The first ‘public domain’ constituency makes either no 
use, or limited use, of copyright protection. The second ‘related revenue’ constituency 
uses copyright protection to maintain control over the content of works, but its members 
benefit from the wide dissemination of copies. The third ‘direct revenue’ constituency 
seeks direct control over who may make copies for sale in the market place. A given 
organisation or individual may be a member of one, two, or all three of the 
constituencies.16 By examining these constituencies, it is possible to identify potential 
conflicts in economic or social interests of the members of these constituencies with 
respect to copyright protection.  
   
4.1.1 The Public Domain Constituency 
This first constituency represents producers of information and it consists of those who 
receive a benefit from the dissemination of their work that is unrelated to their receipt of 
revenue or income. It also includes people who simply want to make a contribution of 
information. Associated with this constituency are users who are interested in 
information for personal and commercial reasons (e.g. the monitoring of publicly 
disclosed research results to identify commercial opportunities).  
 
A substantial amount of the information provided on forerunners of the global 
information infrastructure such as Internet and commercial bulletin board services is 
non-commercial. The authors of much of this information are seeking the broadest 
possible dissemination of this information and they do not charge the receivers. 
Examples include researchers who wish to share scientific data, individuals exchanging 
political viewpoints, and teachers sharing useful teaching materials or their insights 
about education.  
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Both the producers and users in this constituency support the inexpensive distribution of 
public domain information using information infrastructures. Producers often have an 
interest in copyright protection in accord with droit moral to ensure that the content of 
their contribution remains unaltered and that they are recognised as the author of the 
material they contribute. 
 
Although the non-commercial motivations of information producers in the public 
domain constituency are important, the public domain distribution of information also 
generates commercial opportunities. For example, direct commercial returns available 
from public domain information are realised by information service providers who 
charge for access. This group includes the larger commercial information services, 
Internet Service Providers, as well as an enormous network of bulletin board services. 
In addition, the desire of these producers to enhance the value of their contributions 
supports the creation of books, magazines, and software tools for improving the display 
qualities and usability of public domain information especially in the Internet context. 
Users’ interest in finding useful public domain information is also supporting a growing 
market for guides to information services and the creation of electronic databases and 
search engines to improve the likelihood of discovering useful information.  
 
4.1.2 The Related Revenue Constituency 
A second constituency of information producers has an interest in distributing 
information without direct payment for the receipt of that information. However, the 
members of this constituency do expect that the distribution of information will increase 
their future revenues or income. This group includes businesses that provide 
information with the expectation that it will improve their positions with investors, 
citizens, and with customers. Information which falls in the categories of public 
relations and advertising is generally costly for businesses to deliver to their existing or 
potential customers and the spread of World Wide Web access to the Internet appears to 
offer a means of reducing some of these costs. Similar advertising and promotional 
activities are conducted by charitable and non-profit organisations that rely on voluntary 
contributions. 
 
There are important differences between the practice of advertising and public relations 
activities within information infrastructures and the use of traditional media such as 
newspapers, magazines, and particularly direct mail. In these traditional media, the 
study of the demographic characteristics of ‘target’ audiences leads to highly selective 
and focused strategies for achieving exposure. More sophisticated approaches for 
exposing individuals to advertising and promotion messages by the use of information 
infrastructures are emerging quickly. This process is bringing concerns of the user 
community about controlling the receipt of such information to the fore.17 One of the 
attractive techniques is to monitor and analyse individuals using their information 
service requests and other information about them. As a result, concerns about 
individual privacy are becoming more important among the users in this constituency. 
 
Innovative uses of existing information infrastructures (including physical exchange of 
information on discs among individuals and the distribution of discs or CD-ROMs with 
printed magazines) are being made by the producers of so-called ‘shareware’ computer 
programs and other variants of information products. These producers promote the 
copying of their products and exhort users to make a financial contribution if they use 
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the product for more than investigation and trial. There are some indications that this 
strategy does lead to commercial returns for some producers.18 Accompanying the 
growing interest in shareware is the distribution of ‘trial’ versions of software products. 
Trial versions are unlike shareware in that they are limited versions of the full 
commercial version which is usually distributed through ordinary software retail 
channels. 
 
Another innovative use of the existing information infrastructures by the related 
revenue constituency includes companies that offer ‘post-sales’ support to customers 
such as fixes or upgrades to software products (e.g. Digital Equipment Corporation 
operates one of the world's largest Internet sites for this purpose). Distribution of this 
information is a complement to the sale of products and services in which the primary 
copyright or other contractual protections are established outside the information 
infrastructure. In rapidly changing product and service markets, this type of connection 
with customers can provide information which supports product improvements and 
helps to retain customer loyalty thus contributing to future sales. 
 
In general, the members of the related revenue constituency identify connections 
between the information distribution capabilities of the information infrastructure and 
their other business activities. Virtually all of the conventional methods for promoting 
products or customer interest have equivalents in the information infrastructure 
including new product announcements, hints and tips for product use, and customer 
inquiry services.  
 
This definition of the interests of the related revenue constituency highlights the 
copyright implications of the ‘related revenue’ application of the information 
infrastructure. A boundary between the ‘related’ and ‘direct’ revenue is drawn in terms 
of the distribution of the product using the information infrastructure in the latter case, 
and the distribution of information about the product in the former. Copyright 
protection issues are more significant for those companies that are using the information 
infrastructure directly to distribute their products.  
 
One category of activity that bridges the related revenue constituency and the direct sale 
of products and services delivered using information infrastructures is ‘mail order’ 
services. Growth in the numbers of companies offering mail or other forms of non-
infrastructure delivery for products and services has been very rapid particularly 
following the liberalisation of the regulations on the commercial use of the Internet. 
Mail order companies share an interest with those who deliver goods and services using 
the infrastructure. Both have an interest in developing methods of accepting payment 
for goods and services through funds transfer using the information infrastructure and 
secure methods of receiving credit card information from users.  
 
The related revenue constituency has a substantial interest in preventing the alteration of 
the information its members provide (e.g. limitations imposed on the use of trial 
versions of software) through the use of copyright protection in the form of the droit 
moral restriction on the ‘mutilation’ (i.e. alteration) of a work. No court case has tested 
the limits of copyright protection of this type of information distribution to our 
knowledge and it is possible that activities, such as the practice of encouraging users to 
make copies of shareware to give to others, may raise new legal issues. However, it is 
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reasonable to conclude that existing copyright rules will be adequate to defend the 
integrity of this information from modification and to defend the commercial interests 
involved in these activities. 
 
Users of information provided by the producers in the related revenue constituency face 
problems of searching and filtering information that may be of value to them just as 
they do when they are participating as members of the public domain constituency. This 
interest generates demand for guides and directories and related revenue information 
producers are often identified in guides to public domain information. It is unclear 
whether users in this group are, at present, distinct from the users of public domain 
information. In the future, however, these user groups may develop distinct identities 
corresponding to social differences and preferences between individuals who avoid 
advertising messages and those that seek them out. 
 
4.1.3 The Direct Revenue Constituency 
The third constituency of producers and users has an interest in selling and buying 
information goods and services using information infrastructures. Producers in this 
group need a means of protecting the value of their goods and services from those who 
would like to receive them without paying. This group is interested in a high level of 
IPR protection and other types of protection to insure that those who value their 
products and services will actually pay to receive them.  
 
Markets created by members of this constituency for their goods and services are based 
upon: 1) winning a share of existing markets for information distribution using other 
media (i.e. information infrastructures eventually will deliver audio, audio-visual, and 
multimedia products), 2) creating new information products and services that may be 
subject to copyright protection but that is not distributed using other media, and 3) 
creating new services that use the telecommunication features of the information 
infrastructure (e.g. videophone services). IPR is particularly important in the first two 
markets. And the role of patent protection discussed above is important in the case of 
equipment used for the creation of the third market. 
 
The sale of information products and services that can be distributed using other media 
relies upon developments outside the IPR domain. For example, it is often assumed that 
the costs of reproducing and distributing information products fall dramatically when 
such information is distributed via communication networks. However, the 
manufacturing costs of creating copies of information embedded in other media are 
already quite low. For example, in book publishing, the costs of manufacturing a copy 
are a small fraction of the price paid for the book. The other components of the price 
cover the costs of retailers and distributors who promote, stock, and deliver books; the 
costs of the publisher in promoting the work as well as absorbing losses on copies of 
books that are not sold; and the author’s costs. Distribution and unsold inventory costs 
may be reduced by electronic distribution, but some or all of the costs that distributors 
and retailers incur in promoting copyrighted works must be covered by publishers or 
borne by electronic distributors. A similar situation applies to compact discs, packaged 
software (where the author and publisher are usually the same), and pre-recorded audio 
and video tapes. 
 
Information infrastructures are likely to continue to compete with other media for 
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distributing copyrighted works such as books and pre-recorded audio or video 
recordings. Consideration of competition between media for the distribution of 
information helps to explain why a very high level of intellectual property protection 
may be sought by publishers as a pre-requisite for choosing to distribute works over 
information infrastructures.  
 
This does not suggest, however, that electronic distribution media create business 
opportunities that are identical to those in existing markets. For example, the publishers 
of academic journals have long sought effective price discrimination methods that 
would allow them to charge higher prices to libraries and lower prices to individuals. A 
number of more sophisticated approaches are now becoming available for electronic 
journals such as ‘site licenses’ at the level of the university or even nationally. 
Electronic distribution may also encourage new business strategies that take advantage 
of differences between electronic and physical means of distribution. For example, the 
publication of literary works with attractive bindings and typography is likely to 
continue even if lower priced copies of these works are made available using electronic 
information services. 
 
Information distribution using the information infrastructure may also take the form of 
broadcast audio or television programmes. Broadcasts, including those made by public 
broadcasters, are subject to copyright and the rebroadcast or commercial copying of 
broadcasts are generally held to be violations of copyright under the Berne Convention, 
supported by European directives and national copyright laws. As broadcasting 
becomes part of the information infrastructure, copyright protection to prevent copying 
of broadcasts for commercial gain will need to apply in the context of the information 
infrastructure. For instance, high performance features of the information infrastructure 
such as video links can be used to redirect broadcasts or distribute copies of them. 
Video-on-demand access or content may be misappropriated and unauthorised access to 
interactive services may occur. Effective copyright protection is necessary to allow the 
information infrastructure to compete with physical distribution, to cope with the 
problems of electronic distribution of copyrighted broadcasts, and to protect other 
information that is distributed using the information infrastructure. 
 
Producers and users in this constituency who exchange goods and services over the 
information infrastructure have an interest in the development of electronic payment 
mechanisms including credit card entry, validation, and the development of cash 
transfer methods. The main issue in this area concerns the search for effective 
protection of payment mechanisms. It is unclear what mechanism will achieve broad 
market success.19 It is likely that a payment mechanism will be protected using one or 
more types of IPR protection. Experience in credit card markets indicates the potential 
for development of oligopolistic rivalry in this area.20 However, it may be possible for a 
company to develop an internationally accepted standard for creating cash on the 
network and to reinforce its dominant position in this market with IPR protection. Such 
a company could become very large even though its profits on individual transactions 
would be small. Producers and, to a lesser extent, users in the third ‘direct revenue’ 
constituency have a unique interest in copyright protection. Both have an interest in the 
development of effective payment mechanisms that afford secure and reliable means to 
make payments for products and services distributed using the information 
infrastructure. 
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3.2 Shared and Conflicting Interests between the Constituencies 
 
The three constituencies make different use of copyright protection and rely upon it in 
different ways. In addition, producers and users in each group have different interests in 
the effectiveness of copyright protection and the vigour of copyright enforcement. If the 
greatest social benefit is to be derived from the activities of the members of these 
constituencies, it is necessary to consider their shared and conflicting interests. The 
main interest of producers in the public domain group is in retaining some 
acknowledgement that they have created a work. Many works are in the public domain 
and they may be copied, modified, or excerpted without raising user concerns and many 
users voluntarily comply with standards for identifying authorship. 
 
The public domain constituency comes into conflict with the other two constituencies in 
the production and receipt of information that violates copyright protection. Suppliers 
who incorporate copyrighted works without authorisation in their own creations and 
users who receive unauthorised copies of copyrighted works are legally liable for the 
commercial damage that these activities may cause. Similarly, a particular information 
producer may have violated copyright when his or her work is substantially similar in 
expression to a work that is protected. Legal defences against copyright infringement 
cannot be based on inadvertence or ignorance. As a result, any rise in the level of 
intellectual property protection and enforcement has the effect of increasing the liability 
of both producers and users. Users are much more likely to be included in the liability 
risk because network technologies greatly reduce the distinction between producer and 
user. Using these technologies, virtually anyone can become a publisher with a small 
investment. 
 
As in other cases of liability, the policy or legal alternatives are to: a) increase the level 
of monitoring and avoidance of risk in order to reduce liability, b) insure against the risk 
of liability, c) accept the risk in the hope of escaping a legal liability judgement, or d) 
attempt to transfer the liability risk to another party. These choices are being made by 
producers and users as well as information service companies in the public domain 
constituency. Alternatives a) and b) lead to an increase in the costs that potentially must 
be borne by the members of the public domain constituency. Alternatives c) and d) may 
lead to higher costs for the members of this group depending on future changes in the 
level of copyright enforcement. Thus, there are clear conflicts of economic interest 
between the members of the public domain constituency and the members of the other 
two constituencies. 
 
The conflict in interests between the related revenue and direct revenue constituencies is 
less direct. To the extent that higher levels of protection for copyrighted works lead to 
an increase in costs either directly or indirectly in terms of the convenience of access to 
the information produced by the ‘related revenue’ group, the economic interest of this 
group will be damaged. This is because its principle interest is in easy and low cost 
access to information. 
 
If it proves to be possible to develop a widely accepted and secure means of transferring 
copyrighted information between producers and customers then the conflicts between 
these groups might be resolved and they could co-exist.21 However, technical means of 
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protection are imperfect and therefore the interests of the direct revenue constituency 
continue to be in conflict with the public domain and related revenue constituencies. As 
a result, public policy, including policy on copyright protection, must weigh the balance 
between each constituencies’ respective interests and devise solutions.  
 
4.3 Security of Intellectual Property Rights On the Information Infrastructure 
 
Any assessment of these interests needs to be made in the context of an examination of 
the relationship between copyright protection and security issues. This relationship 
involves the security of particular types of information from unauthorised reproduction, 
and the security of the information infrastructure from being used to transmit 
unauthorised copies. If a reliable means of securing an individual’s works was 
available, this would ensure that all of the costs of this security were paid for by those 
who benefit. Enhancing the security of the information infrastructure itself could 
impose costs on all users of network-based services and could have the result of 
sustaining, rather than ameliorating, conflicts in the interests of the three constituencies. 
Neither type of security is widely accepted or effective.  
 
4.3.1 The Security of Different Types of Copyrighted Information 
Information and communication technology systems are designed to transmit and store 
information by creating perfect copies of information at the lowest possible cost. 
Information infrastructures using these technologies, may dramatically reduce the costs 
of making identical and unauthorised copies of copyrighted material. Concern about the 
security of information stored and transmitted over information infrastructures is a 
central issue in determining whether copyright protection can be realistically provided.  
 
There are several routes to reducing, and perhaps eliminating, security problems in the 
transfer of copyrighted information but none of these is costless. Each imposes costs on 
producers and users that may or may not be necessary depending upon the extent of 
copyright protection that is desired and enacted into law. When these costs fall on 
producers and users who are not in the direct revenue constituency, conflicts of interests 
between the constituencies continue to exist.  
 
The first way of enhancing security involves technologies that prevent the unauthorised 
reproduction of copyrighted electronic works. A number of such technologies have been 
devised throughout the history of the computer industry and especially since the 
development of personal computers. Computer manufacturers generally have chosen not 
to implement technological means in support of IPR protection, e.g. individual 
computers are not easily distinguished and therefore no reliable link can be made 
between a particular computer and a copyright license. It is unclear whether this method 
was not adopted because computers are more valuable with more software, the risk of 
computer users refusing to buy the products of a manufacturer who chose to incorporate 
such a method of protection, or the opinion of computer manufacturers that such 
devices could be overcome. The hardware-based copyright protection methods that have 
been devised take the form of ‘keys,’ or add-ons. This method is desirable insofar as it 
imposes all of the costs of copyright protection on those who benefit from it. However, 
only a small number of software products require the use of such a key, and adoption of 
such ‘add ons’ has remained below the threshold needed for widespread use. 
 
14 
A hardware solution, if it were to be effective would allow software programs that 
would check for the key. Other forms of information distribution, such as the 
distribution of audio-visual material would require that the ‘reader’ of such software 
check for the key. A variant of the hardware key technique, the ‘master disc’ method, 
was attempted for one leading software product (Lotus 1-2-3) and other smaller 
companies, but it was unpopular with users and was abandoned. 
 
A second method of protection is to embed copy control schemes in the installation 
software accompanying software packages. This only applies to executable software 
programs and it excludes other means of distributing information that might be 
accessible using alternative ‘readers’. Users are resistant to this technique for a number 
of reasons including hardware failures that destroy legitimate copies of software or 
other information. 
 
A third method is to link users and individual copies of information together. This 
technique requires a user to identify him or herself and receive authorisation codes from 
the software manufacturer. This technique has been used successfully for expensive 
software such as for mainframe computer installations, but it is costly and may be 
resisted by users. This technique has been employed effectively in the CD-ROM market 
where copies of particular programs may be ‘unlocked’ by acquiring the appropriate 
access code. This technique can be used in information networks if the key is linked to a 
individual copy of a program. This requires that producers devise methods of 
customising the identity of every program that is downloaded. The only way around this 
method is to devise fraudulent identity codes or ‘keys’.  
 
Other technologies may emerge in the future. Until a major innovation occurs or 
producers win user acceptance of one or more of the three existing approaches, there 
will be no fully effective mechanism for safeguarding IPRs in software or other 
information distributed between personal computers. This applies to the various 
components of the information infrastructure as a whole. The absence of a broadly 
accepted standard for copy protection in the personal computer world does not mean 
that hardware or software-based protection schemes will not emerge for other 
equipment used in the information infrastructure. In the absence of a highly reliable 
technological method for copyright protection, attention must turn to methods that 
discourage, rather than eliminate, copyright violation.  
 
A starting point for discouraging large-scale copyright violation operations is to include 
methods for labelling individual copies of software and other types of information so 
that it is possible to trace the provenance of a copy. This technique, accompanied by a 
registration procedure, offers a method of detecting the legitimate owner of any copy. 
The inspection of copies for which the user could not demonstrate authorised use would 
be interpreted as suggesting that copyright violation had occurred. Enforcement in this 
area raises legal and practical problems and it is practical only for pursuing large scale 
copying operations or organisations. Preventing the elimination or modification of 
identifying marks by encryption techniques offers additional assurance that an original 
copy can be identified. 
 
Marking techniques and registration procedures require some user co-operation. This 
may be encouraged by a mixture of encouragement and warning. Making these 
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procedures convenient and cheap for authorised users would also encourage their 
acceptance. The use of these techniques to reduce the risks of wholesale copying is 
likely to encourage greater use of the information infrastructure for the distribution of 
copyrighted information. 
 
At present, there are no broadly accepted standards for reliable copy protection of 
software and other information that can be distributed using the information 
infrastructure. However, methods of identifying the provenance of information can be 
improved and users can be encouraged to co-operate with registration procedures. 
 
It is often argued that the highest possible protection is necessary to prevent damage to 
the commercial interests of the owners of information. However, if a high level of 
protection increases the costs of legitimate transactions or reduces the value of the 
information to the users after they have received it, a high standard is not likely to be in 
the interest of either producers or users. If it is accepted that the costs of copyright 
protection should be paid by the producers and users who benefit, then it follows that 
members of the public domain and related revenue constituencies should not have to 
make financial contributions to these costs. It can also be argued, however, that the 
costs of copyright protection should be imposed on all producers and users of the 
information infrastructure. According to this view, there are social benefits in building 
information infrastructures. The expenditure on information infrastructures represents a 
fixed cost and the addition of more users potentially would reduce the costs for all 
users. In this view, the public as a whole should make contributions to the costs of 
research to improve protection methods because of their broad applicability throughout 
the information society. 
 
It is likely that existing methods of protection will be improved. However, they will 
continue to fall short of the stringent levels of protection that generally have been 
sought by the ‘direct revenue’ constituency. It is therefore necessary to consider how 
copyright violations using the information infrastructure can be reduced or eliminated.  
 
4.3.2 Controlling Copyright Infringement Uses of the Information Infrastructure 
The components of the information infrastructure - telecommunication, cable, broadcast 
microwave, and cellular networks - support electronic commerce and trade. As the 
capabilities of these networks are enhanced, and with the possibility that they may 
converge to a common digital format, existing services will be adapted to the new 
environment. Since the costs of enhancing the capabilities of existing networks are 
considerable, network operators and service providers have a substantial interest in 
determining how these networks can be used for information distribution to generate 
new sources of revenue. 
The distribution of copyrighted information is one of the many new revenue generating 
activities that can help to pay for the costs of enhancing the value of the information 
infrastructure. Some proportion of customers will be willing to pay higher access and 
service charges to obtain enhanced connections that will allow them to receive 
copyrighted information in audio-visual, audio, still image, and computer file formats 
for business, social, entertainment, and education purposes. Current trends in the use of 
communication systems provide insight into the interaction between copyright, security, 
and architectural issues.  
 
16 
International uses of telecommunication networks for data communication have 
developed, first, in the academic and public sector focusing on the dissemination of 
information and the reduction of the costs of communication in support of research and 
public functions. The main goal of these developments has been to provide the least 
expensive and restrictive means of accessing and distributing information.22 With the 
growing use of advanced telecommunication services in the commercial activities of 
business, new incentives regarding control of information distribution are emerging. 
Despite the different origins of data communication systems, the different parts of the 
network can be bridged together. Public telecommunication operators have established 
standards for interconnection to allow the flexible interconnection of new capacity 
within their systems and to enable the interconnection of systems that they do not 
directly control. They have also allowed, or been forced to accept, a broader set of 
interconnections with the networks of other commercial enterprises who compete with 
them.  
 
These two systems have different approaches to security issues. Business 
telecommunication systems are based largely on proprietary standards that will be 
retained for some time because they have attractive performance characteristics and a 
large installed base. The research community has pioneered a second approach by 
finding a common denominator with which virtually all existing systems can comply. 
The implementation that has received broadest acceptance is the Internet based on a 
public standard, the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol. 
This system has been tested for a wide variety of information transfer needs over the 
past thirty years.  
 
Despite its popularity, the Internet faces serious problems in the area of copyright 
protection because of security issues. The Internet is regarded by many business 
information system managers as being hazardous to company security and many such 
enterprises have constructed ‘firewalls’ to separate corporate networks 
(Intranets/Extranets) from the Internet. Such ‘firewalls’ have been constructed, not only 
to prevent the loss of control over proprietary information (including liability for 
copyright infringement), but also to prevent importation of viruses and the occurrence 
of other security problems such as service interruptions. 
 
Significant improvements in Internet security for business use require security features 
such as user monitoring and authorisation. This will increase the costs of Internet use to 
the public and users. It raises important issues about privacy (user monitoring of 
electronic mail) and democratic protection (who will do the monitoring). As the Internet 
is increasingly heavily used by public domain constituency, it is unclear who will pay 
for these increased costs. Thus, the conflict between the public domain and direct 
revenue constituencies in the use of the information infrastructure is likely to continue. 
 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 
The absence of a broadly accepted and reliable technological solution, together with the 
problems of increasing security in the use of information services based on the use of 
the Internet, brings the interests of the ‘public domain’ and ‘related revenue’ 
constituencies into direct conflict with the interests of the ‘direct revenue’ constituency. 
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As exposure to problems of copyright infringement increases, there is likely to be 
growing pressure to constrain or regulate public access to public networks. An 
alternative may be to subject public networks to increased monitoring and security 
procedures, thereby increasing costs and compromising user privacy. In either case, it 
will be important to know what is being lost as a result of strengthened copyright 
protection and what might be gained. This will require improved means of monitoring 
the implications of efforts to achieve stronger IPR protection for the users in the public 
domain constituency including their effects on the availability of public domain 
information and on user privacy. 
 
In order to weigh alternative policies that are likely to have a negative impact on the 
three constituencies, it will be necessary to have improved ways of monitoring their 
respective sizes and activities. The continuing failure to develop a broadly accepted and 
reliable means of copyright protection for information distributed over public networks 
raises questions about the seriousness of the need to strengthen copyright protection or 
enforcement. There is a growing need to examine the effectiveness of copyright 
registration systems and the reasons that many existing copy protection schemes have 
not been used broadly for all modes of information distribution using the information 
infrastructure.  
 
The European Commission is likely to face continuing pressure from the ‘direct 
revenue’ and ‘related revenue’ constituencies to strengthen copyright legislation and 
eliminate national disparities in favour of a common ‘single market’ set of standards. 
The diffusion of reliable technical means of securing IPRs is likely to be slower than 
some advocates of technical solutions have forecast. When they are adopted, they are 
likely to spread unevenly across and within different sectors. The costs and other 
consequences of various methods for copyright protection, such as user monitoring and 
other security-related measures, are likely to reduce the accessibility of ‘public domain’ 
information and this is inconsistent with the social goals of the European Information 
Society.  
 
We have outlined some of the conflicts which exist between the interests of the ‘public 
domain’, ‘indirect revenue’, and ‘direct revenue’ constituencies in the control of the 
production, distribution, and use of information. In order to distinguish between the 
rhetoric and practices of the members of these constituencies more accurate and 
complete studies of the implementation of existing IPR legislation is needed together 
with more effective measures of the use of information infrastructures in Europe. The 
social and economic viability of the European Information Society will be strengthened 
or weakened in the light of the way conflicting interests in the IPR field are resolved for 
existing and future information infrastructures. 
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